|
Putting Auction
Theory to Work Paul Milgrom |
|
This book provides a
comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new
applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions
guided the creation of the new spectrum auctions designs. Aimed at graduate
students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date
treatments of both traditional theories of "optimal auctions" and
newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by
example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations or
prominent older designs, such as the Vickery auction design, and evaluates
the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between
the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the
seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and
the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be
respected to encourage participation. It shows how seemingly different
auction designs can lead to nearly identical outcomes if the participating
bidders are the same - a finding that focuses attention on (1) attracting
bidders and (2) minimizing the cost of running the auction and bidding in it.
It shows how new auction designs can accommodate procurement settings and
sales with many interrelated goods. Paul Milgrom is Leonard and Shirley Ely Professor of
Humanities and Social Sciences and professor of Economics at Professor Milgrom's research has been published in the leading
journals in economics, including the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the
Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Economic Theory, the
Journal of Economic Perspectives, and the Journal of Mathematical
Economics. His current interests are in incentive theory, planning, and
auction market design. Professor Milgrom is
internationally known for his work in spectrum auction designs. |
|
|