Cohen Chen, Aner Sela (2005) “Manipulations in Contests”, Economics Letters, 86, 135-139.
Cohen Chen, Aner Sela (2007), "Contests With Ties", The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7, Iss. 1. (Contributions), Article 43.
Cohen Chen, Todd Kaplan and Aner Sela (2008), “Optimal Rewards in Contests” , RAND Journal of Economics, 39 ,434-451.
Cohen Chen, Aner Sela (2008), "Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions”, European Journal of Political Economy, 24, 123-132.
Cohen, C., Shavit, T. and Rosenboim, M.( 2012), "The over-weighting of unfair tie in all-pay contest: An experimental study", International Journal of Economic Theory, 8(3), 301-311.
Cohen, C., and Shavit, T(2012), "Experimental tests of Tullock's contest with and without winner refunds", Research in Economics, 66, 263-272.
Rosenboim, M., Shavit, T., and Cohen,C ( 2012), "Do Bidders Require A Monetary Premium for Cognitive Effort in an Auction?", Journal of Socio Economics, 42, 99-105.
Cohen, C., and Schwartz, M.(2013), "Minimizing Shirking in Auctions and Tournaments", Theoretical Economics Letters, , Vol. 3 No:4, 197-201.
Shavit, T., Rosenboim, M. and Cohen, C (2013), "Does the Color of Feedback Affect Investment Decisions?", International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics, 2(3), 15-26.